

# Year One Report FY2013

Justice & Governance Eastern Afghanistan (JGEA)

Project

(Logar, Khost, Paktia)

July 2012-July 2013



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## Table of Contents

<b>SECTION I—INTRODUCTION</b> .....	4
<b>Section II- Key accomplishments</b> .....	6
<b>Section III: Challenges Faced</b> .....	13
<b>Section IV: Summary of all Year’s Indicators</b> .....	16

<b>General Information</b>	<b>Project Start Date</b>	<b>04 July 2012</b>
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	<b>Project Name</b>	<b>Justice &amp; Governance in Eastern Afghanistan (JGEA)</b>
	<b>Organization</b>	<b>The Liaison Office</b>
<b>Project Location</b>	<b>Logar, Paktia and Khost</b>	
<b>Project Status</b>	<b>Contract Signed</b>	<b>04 July 2012</b>
	<b>Ongoing</b>	<b>Ongoing</b>
	<b>Cancelled</b>	
	<b>Completed</b>	

## **SECTION I—INTRODUCTION**

The Justice & Governance Eastern Afghanistan (JGEA) project focuses on the establishment of Commissions on dispute resolution shuras, dubbed Commissions on Conflict Mediation (CCMs) in Paktia, Khost, and Logar. The CCMs include traditional elders that represent the population of their provinces and reflect its demography and geography, and seek to resolve disputes and, especially at the regional level, develop policy recommendations and cooperation modalities. Working with respected elders already known to TLO, civil society leaders, and relevant government officials in each target province, TLO has established a transparent process to select 20 persons to form a body comprising traditional elders, local religious leaders, and other individuals that can contribute to the enduring resolution of disputes.

Each CCM was balanced to reflect the province's tribal and ethnic makeup helping to ensure province-wide reach and promote collaboration. Each has also met regularly with its respective provincial government (provincial governor or representative, Department of Justice and Department of Economy, both benefitting from, and complementing, government dispute resolution efforts). Although TLO has imposed no hard requirement here, about one-third of CCM cases have received government registration, and each provincial government has reviewed the large majority of CCM decisions in its province for compliance with Afghan statutory and Sharia law – and found them compliant.

The main tasks to establish the CCMs were recruiting project staff in each location; securing the approval of each provincial government; establishing a transparent process to select CCM members that are representative of the population; selecting CCM members; developing CCM working procedures; and operationalizing the CCMs.

Since the CCMs started their activities, TLO has reviewed and analyzed both each case the CCMs decided, and the cases as a group, in order to help identify major conflict actors, patterns, and trends, as well as to provide some (more-or-less real-time) insight into the CCMs' successes or shortcomings; TLO, as possible and only with the prior consent of the CCMs has also begun the process of posting CCM decisions on the Project website, in order to increase transparency and accountability. Project records and CCM decisions have, finally, provided a solid foundation on which to base an evaluation of CCM procedures at the end of this first year.

Working in close collaboration with the provincial government, the project has supported linkages and contributed to good governance at sub-national and national level through five components:

- 1) **Representatives CCMs Established in Paktia, Khost and Logar, where TLO:** secured the approval of each provincial government; selected CCM members that are representatives of the population; facilitated CCM members in developing robust working procedures.
- 2) **Regional CCM Established:** 21 members (seven members from each provincial CCM) which has developed modalities for inter-provincial cooperation.
- 3) **Implemented capacity Development Initiatives for CCM Members:** conducted one capacity development training sessions for each CCM to increase awareness of Afghanistan's Constitution and laws, Sharia (which under Article three of the Constitution is the basis of all Afghan legislation) and human rights principles.
- 4) **CCMs have obtained an increased Awareness of Women's rights and Have developed women's Engagement Strategies** that have included, for the first time, the inclusion of women CCM members on the Khost and Logar CCMs, and the regular engagement of the Paktia CCM with provincial women's leaders.
- 5) **Enhance Cooperation between CCMs and Sub-National Governance Stakeholders:** TLO enabled the CCMs in the initiation of confidence-building measures and raising awareness of the role and mandate of CCMs in order to promote government cooperation and support throughout the lives of the CCMs.

Following the present introduction, this report further details key project accomplishments, challenges faced (and plans to address them), explication of achievements against each project indicator, and details of each of the 47 disputes the CCMs have resolved in their first year.

## SECTION II- KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

During its first year of implementation, TLO-JGEA project was able to meet several major programmatic milestones: the completion of conflict surveys in each target province; CCM set up at each location, as well as a regional CCM; the resolution, or at least ceasefire, of 47 conflicts (see table 1, as well as Appendix I for further details of each resolved conflict); carrying out capacity-building initiatives for CCM members; and facilitating women’s engagement on the CCMs.

**Table 1: Conflict Resolved by province**

Province	# of conflicts resolved	Type of conflict
Khost	15	Irrigated and rainfed lands, family disputes, inherited land, and verbal fight
Paktia	13	Irrigated and rainfed lands, family disputes, criminal, forest, and micro-hydro power
Logar	19	Irrigated and rainfed lands, family disputes, criminal, inherited land, and related to cash
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	

### ***Conflict Survey Completion***

Three major resource conflict surveys were begun in Logar, Paktia and Khost provinces. These were able to cover all provincial areas, including insecure areas such as Zurmat in Paktia, Barak-i Barak in Logar or the “Zadran Arc” in Paktia and Khost.

However, it is important to note that, although all targets were eventually fulfilled, project staff were not able to fully complete this activity within the planned quarter. Two reasons for this deficiency stand out. First, in Logar and Paktia, CCM stand-up took longer than expected, meaning, for present purposes, that project research staff did not for a time have the benefit of the assistance of CCM members for district access. Second, in Khost, where CCM stand-up was notably rapid, a period of particularly bad security temporarily hindered access to districts.

Since that time, CCM stand-up in Paktia and Logar has finished, so TLO does not expect delays of any research-type activities relating to the absence of CCM members to reoccur. For Khost,

TLO cannot of course guarantee against a renewed deterioration in security. However, one should note that this security deterioration delayed project activities, but did not prevent them.

Once these difficulties had been resolved, the project teams of the relevant provinces identified total 69 major resources conflicts in various districts throughout each target province (see Table 2 below). Three meetings were held with CCM members in each province to share the results of the survey.

**Table 2: Conflict Survey Results by Province**

Province	Source of conflict	Number of Conflicts
Khost	Land, Mountain, Forest, and Family Dispute	11
Paktia	Land (Rainfed , Hilly, Mountain, Forests) and Family Dispute	27
Logar	Rainfed land, Family Dispute	31
<b>Total</b>		<b>69</b>

Similarities and differences in provincial conflict patterns emerged during the course of these surveys. For example, Khost and Paktia both recorded a large number of conflicts over mountains. In these cases, the mountain, per se, was not the object of the conflict. Rather, because mountains often contain water sources and significant forests, they have importance both for agriculture and for cash generation, especially as many forests in Southeast Afghanistan face severe depletion.

Logar, a relatively flat province, did not record any mountain conflicts. However, it did record a notably large number of “rainfed land” conflicts. Three factors stand out here. First, as populations increase, rainfed (as opposed to irrigated) land increases in value due to its suitability for housing and commercial development. Second, because the land is less agriculturally productive than irrigated land, and so not used as regularly, those seeking to distribute land (including the Afghan government) often perceive it as empty, though, quite often, one or more groups will have a residual claim over it. Third, the government in Kabul has been making efforts to find land for Kuchi settlements, with the use of rainfed land in Logar being particularly prominent.<sup>1</sup> Thus, because the importance of the land is increasing, and because, at the same time, Kuchi groups (at the government’s behest) are moving into the area, a large number of conflicts over this land have emerged.

<sup>1</sup> President Karzai has reportedly issued a decree directing the settlement of Kuchis in Logar.

## ***Representatives CCMs Established in Paktia, Khost and Logar***

- ***Set up and Membership of the Khost CCM***

Of the three CCMs, set-up in Khost proceeded the most quickly and efficiently. Within a few days of the official start of project activities (i.e. after the two-month ramp-up period), TLO staff in Khost had drafted a members list, cleared it with the TLO Kabul office, and shortly thereafter received approval from the provincial governor, line departments, and provincial council.

At least two factors contributed to this unusually expeditious set-up. First, the CCM in Khost – under different guises, and with different funding streams – has been active fairly consistently since 2007. The receipt of donor funds provided a chance to expand CCM activities, ensure more regular meetings, provide capacity-building for members, and reexamine the official members' list<sup>2</sup> but, certainly, TLO had “more to work with” in Khost than it did in other target provinces.

Second, TLO's long-time Liaison Officer in Khost, who originally developed the CCM concept in 2007, is himself a very prominent tribal elder, who was then able to recruit the former Deputy Head of Khost's Provincial Council as CCM Facilitator.<sup>3</sup> Because recruitment for these key positions either was not necessary (in the case of the Liaison Officer) or was completed very quickly (in the case of the Facilitator), recruitment of CCM members themselves could also proceed ahead of schedule.

The primary qualification of most Khost CCM members is their being prominent tribal elders. Aside from tribal elders, per se, several Khost CCM members are former commanders (including one former governor of Takhar and Kunduz); two are Sharia scholars; and one, a woman, is head of the Department of Women's Affairs in Khost.

- ***Set up and Membership of the Logar CCM***

In setting up the Logar CCM, TLO first identified a highly experienced Liaison Officer who facilitated TLO access to areas, and their local leaders, throughout the province. TLO then conducted extensive consultations with bodies including the provincial governor's office, representatives of Department of Economy, Provincial Council, Tribal Affairs Department, DOWA, Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, local spinsari, and local shuras, in order to perform a transparent process to select 20 persons, representative of the greater

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<sup>2</sup>Some TLO senior staff had expressed concerns that the CCM, since 2009, had become too much a creature of the provincial governor, and had lost much of its independence (thus also threatening its credibility as a “bridging” body between the people and the state). With that said, the Khost governor extended his full cooperation in CCM reform/revival within the province.

<sup>3</sup> Please note that TLO only retained the services of this individual after a competitive and transparent interview process.



ethnic diversity in Logar province (as opposed to Paktia and Khost)<sup>4</sup>, to form a body comprising traditional elders, local religious leaders, and other individuals that can contribute to the enduring resolution of disputes. Because of the length of these consultations, TLO's relative lack of experience in Logar, and the changing of the Provincial Governor (requiring re-consultation), CCM set-up in Logar proved a protracted, if ultimately successful, process. As with its fellow CCMs, the Logar body was balanced by ethnicity and tribe (see below) and approved by the new Logar provincial governor.

With that said, the membership of the Logar CCM is notably different than its Paktia and Khost counterparts. Only a minority of members appear to be tribal elders (5-6 out of 20), with a correspondingly higher number of religious scholars, doctors, and former commanders. One should also note greater ethnic diversity on this CCM, on which sit not only a Kuchis' representative, but also a significant number of local Tajik leaders as well as representatives of the Shia religious minority. Logar CCM members additionally appear more educated than members in Paktia and Khost, with nearly all having completed highschool, and a significant minority having completed post-secondary education.

- ***Set up and Membership of the Paktia CCM***

The set-up of the Paktia CCM, and recruitment of a Paktia Liaison Officer, took longer than in any other province. In this case, TLO's years of work (since 2003) in Paktia actually seem to have, to an extent, worked against the organization. More specifically, TLO's networks within Paktia remain unrivalled, but the vibrancy of these networks also exposes TLO, especially at crucial points like project launch, to the vicissitudes of provincial politics. As a result, when choosing a Liaison Officer, TLO had to take into account that it had, especially in 2009-2011, become over-associated with Paktia's Ahmadzai tribe; while at the same time not forgetting the many tribal leaders who have over the years rendered to TLO invaluable service.

With these considerations in mind, TLO opted to work with provincial religious leadership to find a proper Liaison Officer, i.e. someone with credibility among all tribal parties. Similarly, TLO felt a particularly acute need, in Paktia, to undertake multiple rounds of consultation with government, tribal, and CSO stakeholders.

Fortunately, TLO successfully found a properly qualified Liaison Officer, and the current CCM is notably inclusive of the range of Paktia's tribal and governmental stakeholders. Nevertheless, because selecting a Liaison Officer proved so delicate an operation, and because of the aforementioned lengthy consultative process, CCM set-up in Paktia did take longer than initially anticipated.

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<sup>4</sup>Paktia and Khost are overwhelmingly Pashtun (without prejudice to Dari-speaking populations, such as Gardezis). Logar, by contrast, is divided between Pashtuns and Tajiks.

A plurality (or slight majority, depending upon how one constructs these categories) of Paktia CCM members are traditional tribal elders, including a representative of Paktia's Kuchis. To a greater extent than the other CCMs, Paktia members also boast connections, whether formal or informal, to provincial government bodies (Provincial Governor's Office and Provincial Council in particular<sup>5</sup>), another result of extensive government consultations in that province. Of note, and unlike some other Paktia institutions, the CCM also has extensive representation of the Zadran tribe, which some inaccurately view as anti-government, including CCM members from Gard-e Serai and Wazi Zadran districts.

### ***Regional CCM Established***

After the establishment of the provincial CCMs, TLO facilitated the establishment of a regional CCM (RCCM) covering the Southeast (Paktia and Khost) and Central (Logar) regions. The RCCM has adopted a similar process to select members in order to ensure a balance between major ethnicities and tribal groups, and has included minority (particularly Kuchi) representation. The Same RCCM members will continue addressing the inter-provincial conflicts and provide policy inputs at national level in the year 2.

### ***Establishment of capacity Development Initiatives for CCM Members***

In order to improve the legal capacity of CCM members, the JGEA project has conducted three capacity development training sessions two days each for each CCM to increase awareness of Afghanistan's Constitution and laws, Sharia (and human rights principles. The trainings also provided comparative examples from other legal jurisdictions, including regarding alternative dispute resolution and procedural and administrative matters such as record keeping and enforcement of judgments. This legal pluralist approach has been particularly useful for Afghanistan's legal system that incorporates civil, Islamic and traditional laws. In year one, this pluralist, yet Islamic, approach was particularly helpful as it concerns women who are accorded greater rights under both Sharia and statutory law than under traditional codes of honor, most notably in *Pashtunwali*. The comparative approach has also provided CCM members with examples of how other traditional justice providers have established linkages and coordinated with governments.

Regarding the trainings already delivered in the year one CCM members explicitly mentioned that their thinking processes are flexible. They stated that, before training, when presented with a problem they had not seen, they were relatively less able to develop creative ways to

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<sup>5</sup> In Paktia relations between the PC and PG have often been strained; thus the need for active coordination balanced between both of these stakeholders.

address the issue. CCM members also regularly reported (borne out by case examples) the incorporation of, especially, Sharia principles into their dispute resolution practice. As Appendix I makes clear, this incorporation was especially notable for inheritance conflicts, leading to a concrete increase in the observance of women's rights in the project target area.

### ***CCMs have an increased Awareness of Women's rights and Have developed women's Engagement Strategies***

In the year one each CCM has been able to develop its women engagement strategy for its province.

To develop this engagement strategy, TLO facilitated a series of consultations between CCMs and local government officials, women's civil society leaders, and *spinsari*. These consultations have helped the CCMs further developed their strategies for women to take an active part in CCM tasks and activities. In year two the TLO will then both aid the CCMs in implementation of these strategies within their provinces, and work with the CCMs to develop concrete, implementable plans for expanding the coverage of women's conflict in each project location.

### ***(Unanticipated) Outcome Comment: Women Members on Khost and Logar CCMs***

At no stage did TLO dictate the purposes or conditions of women's CCM involvement. Although fairly confident that some level of women's participation would prove possible, experience on past related projects (e.g. in Nangarhar) indicated that actually having female CCM members might be unwise or impossible.

However, after discussing the matter with project stakeholders, male CCM members in Logar and Khost themselves suggested including women on the bodies. In each province, women's leaders from the provincial DoWA are now working with their male counterparts in the mediation of disputes.

### ***Enhance Cooperation between CCMs and Sub-National Governance Stakeholders***

In the year one the CCMs has conducted total 22 confidence-building meetings to enhance coordination between informal justice providers and sub-national and national GIRoA officials, increase awareness of CCMs with the national government and foster linkages between the informal and formal justice systems in the southeast. These meetings have been conducted with provincial governors, their line departments such as the DoJ, Huquq Department, Women's Affairs Departments, provincial Attorneys General, and Departments of Tribal Affairs, as well as provincial councils. The agendas of those meetings were mostly major conflicts, inter-tribal conflicts, and incorporating Afghan statutory and Sharia during the traditional conflict resolution. As a result of these meetings, the linkages between the formal and informal justice

systems have been increased in each province. For instance, before the establishment of the CCMs, the government Huquq departments would, reportedly, not officially refer conflicts to local elders for resolution. Since that time, provincial governments have referred roughly one third of the CCMs' caseloads, and meetings have occurred between CCMs and government officials at least twice a week (above and beyond government-CCM confidence-building meetings facilitated by TLO).

## **SECTION III: CHALLENGES FACED**

### **Lateness of Some Project Activities**

Per the above, this project's training and conflict surveying components both faced delays, as has set-up of the project website. These delays in turn most prominently stemmed from lengthy CCM selection processes in Paktia and Logar, on the one hand, and a lack of IT capacity within TLO, on the other.

Additionally, the CCMs' beginning to meet ahead of schedule also itself seems to have caused some delays. To wit, initial project planning anticipated CCM members receiving at least one round of training before receiving cases. However, after set-up both CCM members themselves and provincial government officials moved very quickly to have the CCMs begin taking cases. Because CCM members are highly-experienced mediators and also count amongst their members religious and legal scholars<sup>6</sup>, TLO did not view this course of events as inherently problematic. Nevertheless, it did mean that project resources and the attention of project staff shifted from trainings provision to the support and recordation of CCM conflict resolution activities, with CCM member trainings getting too little attention.

### **Insufficient Scope of Some Project Activities**

As above, TLO has conducted one round of capacity-building training for each CCM, and two regional CCM meetings. On the one hand, CCM member feedback from the trainings and regional events has been overwhelmingly positive, suggesting that these activities were at least somewhat responsive to CCM member needs and desires. On the other hand, CCM members also consistently told TLO that the activities were in many ways insufficient: more trainings will be needed to have maximum beneficial impact, and the regional CCM should meet more frequently in order to foster interprovincial linkages. Even if well-designed, then, the pace of these activities appears to have been at least sub-optimal, and perhaps insufficient, to reach desired project outcomes.

### **Weak Outreach at Kabul Level**

TLO anticipated this project element to have two components: meetings with governmental and international stakeholders during RCCM sessions in Kabul; and more regular contacts between CCM members and national government officials, in a parallel process to provincial outreach efforts. While RCCM outreach improved during year one, more regular contacts with the Kabul government remained weak throughout.

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<sup>6</sup> Relatedly, five members of the Logar CCM have received legal training (Sharia and statutory law) from Checchi Consulting.

As to the RCCM, while its first meeting seemed productive, TLO was not able to arrange any follow-on meetings with Kabul-level stakeholders, leaving that project element unfulfilled. For the second RCCM meeting, however, TLO made a point of beginning Kabul-level coordination well beforehand, and was able to arrange in total five stakeholder meetings for the RCCM, with governmental (United States, European Union, Canada) and non-governmental (Open Society Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace) counterparts. Notably, however, these meetings did not include the Kabul government.

Similarly, during project year one, CCM members had little, if any, project-related contact with the Kabul government (it is likely that some CCM members met with Kabul government officials of their own accord, but TLO did not facilitate or monitor the meetings). Proximate causes for this deficiency seem to have been two. First, given the size and complexity of the Kabul government, TLO proved unable to identify a proper Kabul government counterpart (e.g. should we begin meetings with the Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs)? Second, in the absence of a clear national counterpart, TLO failed to provide sufficiently strong direction regarding with which officials to meet on what schedule. As a result, during year one this project component largely fell by the wayside.

### ***Measures To Correct Areas of Project Weakness***

First, of the above issues, insufficient scope of some project activities appears, at this time, to be the easiest to remedy. Here TLO, for year two of the project, has realigned its budget, including correcting some poorly formulated budget lines, to allow an additional three (instead of one) round of training per province, and three (instead of two) RCCM meetings. At the end of year two, TLO will likewise assess whether this expanded scope of activity meets beneficiary demand.

Second, TLO is formulating a concrete plan to expand outreach at the Kabul level. Organizational management is drafting a more-specific ToR for the Kabul Liaison Officer, as well as a separate work plan for which officials to meet; in which order; and when. TLO plans to first arrange meetings with government officials thought likely to be receptive to the CCMs and their work, such as the Independent Directorate of Kuchi Affairs, and Independent Directorate of Local Governance; and then move on to official bodies thought to be somewhat more skeptical, though not necessarily opposed to, the CCMs such as the Ministry of Justice. Third and finally, TLO feels confident in being able to address (or at least not repeat) the lateness of some, but not all, activities. For expanded project trainings, TLO's experience during year one has allowed it to identify suitable CCM trainers. Since identifying trainers was previously a significant source of delay, TLO feels reasonably confident that it can avoid such difficulties in year two. By contrast, TLO is still in the process of developing a strategy to bring the project website online. Unfortunately, website development falls well outside the core competencies of either TLO's international or its local staff. Thus TLO continues to face difficulties in identifying an



appropriate technical focal point for this project element, even if website development itself will be outsourced. With that said, TLO will continue to work through this problem, and keep the donor apprised of all developments.

## SECTION IV: SUMMARY OF ALL YEAR'S INDICATORS

Table 1: outputs, Activities, Indicators and Achievements in year one

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>1.1.1 MOU or similar document signed indicating government cooperation</b>	Meet with government of each target province	Three MOUs approving the creation of the CCMs and other project activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A total of 3 MOUs for the creation and approving of three provincial CCMs and other activities of the project weresigned by the three provincial governments.</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.2 Number of Staff Hired</b>	<p>Develop ToRs for remaining project staff</p> <p>Place job notices for remaining project staff</p> <p>Interview, evaluate and hire remaining project staff</p> <p>Secure or upgrade office facilities in Paktia, Khost and Logar</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hiring/assigning of one Project Manager</li> <li>Hiring/assigning of one Project Monitor</li> <li>Hiring/assigning of one Program Assistant</li> <li>Hiring/assigning of three Liaison Officers</li> </ul>	<p>A total of 6 people have been recruited as project staff they are as follow;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 project Manager was employed</li> <li>1 project monitor was employed</li> <li>1 program assistant was employed</li> <li>3 Liaison Officers were employed</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.3 Number of offices arranged/furnished</b>	Secure or upgrade office facilities in Paktia, Khost and Logar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Two offices are upgraded (Paktia and Khost)</li> <li>One office is set up</li> </ul>	<p>A total of 3 offices have been upgraded as follow;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>offices were upgraded (Paktia and Khost)</li> <li>office was set up in Logar</li> </ul>



Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
		(Logar)	
<b>1.1.4 Number of persons who agree to take part on the CCMs</b>	Meetings with elders and religious leaders from each province  Meetings with provincial government officials	The selection of 20 CCM members in each province	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A total of 20 CCM members were selected in each target province (Logar, Paktia and Khost) in the southeast.</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.5 Number of approved lists of CCM members</b>	Present CCM members lists to government officials for approval	Three registered/approved lists of CCM members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 approved CCM members' lists</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.6: Extent of each cooperation agreement</b>	Work out initial agreement for government-CCM cooperation	Three cooperation agreements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A total of 3 cooperation agreements were received from the provincial governments and these agreements have also been extended to the provincial line departments for their acknowledgment about the establishment of CCMs in the target provinces and have also been recorded in the field and TLO main office.</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.7 Working procedures agreed amongst CCM members in each CCM</b>	Meetings between Project staff and CCMs  Develop working procedures  Translation and analysis of CCM working procedures	Three sets of working procedures  Three translations of working procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A total of 3 sets of CCM working procedures were developed with close consultation of CCM members. These 3 working procedures have also been agreed amongst the CCM members in each CCM in the target province (Logar, Paktia and Khost) in the southeast.</li> <li>A total of 3 translations of these CCM working procedures were prepared in two local languages Pashto and Dari.</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>1.1.8 Including of clauses for minority and women's issues in CCM working procedures</b>	<p>Meetings between Project staff and CCMs</p> <p>Develop working procedures</p> <p>Translation and analysis of CCM working procedures</p>	<b>N/A</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Each set of working procedures contains clauses designed to protect minorities and women</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.9 Number of conflicts identified</b>	<p>Developing a list of interview/ survey questions</p> <p>Interviewing CCM members regarding large conflicts of which they are already aware</p> <p>Surveying other prominent formal and informal leaders throughout each province to identify other major conflicts</p> <p>The compilation, translation and analysis of histories/ descriptions of each conflict</p>	<b>3 completed conflict surveys</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A total of 3 Major resource based conflict surveys were conducted in districts and centers of each target province (Logar, Paktia and Khost).</li> <li>A total of 69 major conflicts have been identified in the result of the survey conducted in the mentioned provinces</li> </ul>



Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>1.1.10 Geographic Scope of Conflicts Identified</b>	Developing a list of interview/ survey questions  Interviewing CCM members regarding large conflicts of which they are already aware  Surveying other prominent formal and informal leaders throughout each province to identify other major conflicts  The compilation, translation and analysis of histories/ descriptions of each conflict	<b>N/A</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• A total of 3 Major resource based conflict surveys were conducted in districts and centers of each target province (Logar, Paktia and Khost).</li></ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>1.1.11 Number of meetings held with CCM members</b>	Sharing analysis with CCMs	<b>Three meetings held with CCM members</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 meetings were conducted one with each CCM and shared the conflicts identified at the end of the survey in each province</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.12 Number of CCM meetings held</b>	CCMs begin to meet	At least 16 CCM meetings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A total of 54 CCM bi-weekly meetings were conducted: 20 in Khost, 18 in Paktia, and 16 in Logar.</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.13 Number of conflicts resolved by the CCMs</b>	CCMs hear cases and issue decisions	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A total of 47 conflicts were resolved by the CCMs in the year one.</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.14 Number of CCM decisions recorded</b>	Record CCM outputs  Translate CCM outputs	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All CCM decisions have been recorded</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.15 Number of CCM decisions posted to website</b>	Publication of selected CCM outputs on project website	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Zero CCM decisions posted to project website</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.16 Number of persons visiting website</b>	N/A	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project website not yet operational</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.17 Number of CCM decisions receiving commentary from formal government officials</b>	Review CCM decisions with formal justice officials	Increased knowledge of conflict factors and trends among CCM members and government personnel	<p>Each CCM has submitted its decisions for review by formal government officials</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The Logar CCM has submitted total <b>19</b> decisions to the Huquq department.</li> <li>2) The Khost CCM has submitted <b>15</b> decisions to the Huquq department.</li> <li>3) The Paktia CCM has submitted <b>13</b> its decisions to the Huquq department.</li> </ol>



Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>1.1.18 Number of CCM decisions violating Sharia or statutory law</b>	Review CCM decisions with formal justice officials	N/A	No CCM decisions have been found to violate Sharia or statutory law
<b>1.1.19 Number of CCM cases that are adhered to after 6 months (or at month 12)</b>	Check to see whether CCM decisions have settled conflict and been observed after obtaining initial agreement	Each CCM decision followed up after 6 months or at month 12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO has followed up all CCM decisions, and found a compliance rate of about 95% (2 out of 47 case resolutions have broken down)</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.20 Number of factors identified as to what causes a decision to last or not last</b>	Analyze why this may or may not be occurring		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brief analysis of what causes decisions to last or not last included in Year 1 report</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.21 Number of recommendations for CCM improvement developed</b>	Review CCM logistical arrangements  Review CCM working procedures  Review CCM decisions  Recommend, as needed, modifications to CCM arrangements	One yearly report, containing information on the project's operation, successes and failures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One yearly report produced</li> </ul>
<b>1.1.22 Number of</b>	Discuss findings with	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO has shared initial Year One Report findings with all project</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
discussions held with CCM members	CCM members and project staff		staff and CCMs for their input
<b>1.1.23 Perception of CCM effectiveness by elders, local government officials, and local community leaders</b>	Discuss findings with local government officials, religious leaders, and community leaders	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discussions have uniformly indicated that the CCMs are regarded as effective and accepted by communities, with some government officials independently offering to continue to support the CCMs after outside funding ceases</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.1 Number of topics (i.e. issues for policy discussion or major regional conflicts) identified and approved</b>	<p>Review outstanding regional issues</p> <p>Meet with CCM members regarding regional topics</p> <p>Develop agenda for regional CCM</p>	Two sets of topics selected (one for each RCCM meeting)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Two sets of topics selected</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.2 Number of members selected for regional commission</b>	Facilitate the CCMs in selecting RCCM members	21 persons (7 from each project location) selected for RCCM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>21 RCCM members selected</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.3 Number of demographic groups represented on RCCM</b>	Facilitate the CCMs in selecting RCCM members	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minority groups (Kuchi, Shia) well represented on RCCM. However, women not present on the RCCM because of the difficulty of traveling outside their home areas for extended periods.</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.4 Number of RCCM outputs</b>	<p>Hold RCCM Meeting</p> <p>Region RCCM discussions</p> <p>Translate RCCM discussions for analysis</p>	Two RCCM output reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RCCM produced two output reports summarizing its discussions, and particularly focusing on means to increase regional cooperation between provincial CCMs (e.g. if an accident, hence dispute, occurs on the Kabul-Khost highway)</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
	Make output report summarizing these discussions and analysis		
<b>1.2.5 Number of activities recorded and translated</b>	Record RCCM outputs  Translate RCCM outputs	All RCCM outputs recorded and translated  Decisions/recommendations translated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All RCCM outputs translated and included in RCCM output reports</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.6 Number of outputs posted to website</b>	Post RCCM outputs to project website (after recordation and translation)	RCCM outputs posted online to the extent possible	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As the project website is not yet functional, no RCCM outputs were posted</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.7 Number of persons visiting website</b>	N/A	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As the project website is not yet functional, no persons are visiting it</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.8 Number of interviews conducted</b>	Interview CCM members re: RCCM decisions	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CCMs were comprehensively consulted re: the RCCM</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.9 Number of meetings conducted</b>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
<b>1.2.10 Number of regional cases that have proven lasting or not lasting</b>	Check to see whether RCCM decisions have settled conflict and been observed after obtaining initial agreement  Analyze why this might or might not be occurring	The lasting impact of RCCM decisions is indicated positively or negatively  Some idea is obtained as to why regional CCM decisions are or are not lasting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At its meetings, the RCCM restricted itself (so to speak) to offering provincial CCMs advice on how they might better address cases in their home provinces, and implementing modalities for how provincial CCMs could better cooperate – the RCCM did not directly address cases itself. Thus this indicator could not be measured</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>1.2.11 Number of RCCM activities receiving commentary from government officials</b>	Review with, and receive commentary from, government officials re: RCCM outputs	RCCM activities analyzed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO and RCCM members of their own initiative kept provincial government officials fully abreast of RCCM activities and member selection.</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.12 Number of RCCM activities violating Afghan statutory or Sharia law</b>	Share RCCM outputs with government officials	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Because of the nature of the activities the RCCM chose – advising/encouraging provincial CCMs and working out methods for better regional cooperation – the chances of RCCM outputs violating statutory or Sharia law was minimized. With that said, no RCCM outputs seem to have committed such a violation.</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.13 Number of factors identified as to what makes a decision last or not last</b>	Check to see whether RCCM decisions have settled conflict and been observed after obtaining initial agreement  Analyze why this may or may not be occurring	The lasting impact of RCCM decisions is indicated positively or negatively  Some idea is obtained as to why RCCM decisions are or are not lasting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO has followed up each RCCM output. However, because of the aforementioned nature of the outputs, they do not particularly lend themselves to an analysis of this sort. With that being said, TLO has documented regional cooperation between provincial CCMs to be increasing based upon ties forged between provincial CCM members at the RCCM (and without any particular instigation from TLO). Thus a degree of sustainability seems implied.</li> </ul>
<b>1.2.14 Number of factors identified contributing to RCCM success or failure and recommendations developed</b>	Review RCCM logistical arrangements  Review RCCM working procedures  Review RCCM decisions	RCCM analysis and recommendations revised and compiled into mid-term report  Knowledge improved of the strengths and weaknesses of the RCCM  Knowledge improved of strengths and weaknesses of ADR institutions more	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO has developed a responsive list of modifications to RCCM procedures for the second year of project operation.</li> </ul>



Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
		generally	
<b>1.3.1 Number of training topics selected</b>	<p>Consult project staff on potential training topics</p> <p>Consult CCM members on potential training topics</p> <p>Select training topics</p>	Training topics selected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>After consultations, TL O selected training topics in each location responsive to CCM needs (as based upon the feedback of CCM members)</li> </ul>
<b>1.3.2 Training and support staff identified and their services retained</b>	<p>Consult project staff to determine capabilities</p> <p>Select project staff to conduct and facilitate trainings, as possible</p> <p>Recruit outside persons to conduct project trainings, as needed</p>	<p>Project staff selected to conduct and facilitate trainings</p> <p>Outside persons recruited to perform trainings</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO successfully recruited qualified persons to perform each training (long-term TLO staff for Paktia and Logar trainings, and a CCM member, and religious scholar, for the Khost training)</li> </ul>
<b>1.3.3 Number of CCM members attending training</b>	<p>Finalize training agenda and logistics</p> <p>Conduct trainings</p>	<p>Three venues arranged</p> <p>Refreshments arranged for three venues</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>15 CCM members in Khost, 16 in Logar, and 20 in Paktia attended trainings. In each location, an additional five women's leaders also attended for, respectively, 20 persons receiving training in Khost, 21 in Logar, and 25 in paktia.</li> </ul>
<b>1.3.4 Number of suggestions developed</b>	Get feedback from training participants	Trainings followed up in each province after a set	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO followed up trainings in each location, and developed, based upon overwhelmingly positive feedback, an expanded training</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
	via feedback form  Interview training participants  Assess value of trainings  Modify trainings plan	time interval (e.g. 5 months, or at month 12)	plan for Year 2
<b>1.3.5 Number of modifications to training plan (as necessary)</b>	Get feedback from training participants via feedback form  Interview training participants  Assess value of trainings  Modify trainings plan	Trainings followed up in each province after a set time interval (e.g. 5 months, or at month 12)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO followed up trainings in each location, and developed, based upon overwhelmingly positive feedback, an expanded training plan for Year 2</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.1 Number of discussions held with project staff and CCM members [regarding women's increased CCM involvement]</b>	Pre-discussions with project staff  Discussions with CCM members	At least one round of discussions between CCM members and project staff in each target province	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO conducted discussions with project staff and CCM members in each target province</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.2 Number of suggestions received from CCM members regarding the improved</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(see above)</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>representation of women on the CCMs</b>			
<b>1.4.3 Number of meetings held with CSOs</b>	Identify women's groups whom to engage in discussion  Engage such women's group in discussion	At least one round of discussions held in each province with women's CSO leaders and the DWA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discussions held in each target province</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.4 Number of suggestions received from CSOs</b>	Develop suggestions for improving women's representation	Improved strategy for women's representation on the CCMs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women's CSO and DWA suggestions incorporated into women's engagement strategies</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.5 Number of meetings held with spinsari</b>	Identify/liaise with local spinsari  Engage such women elders in discussion  Develop further suggestions for improving women's representation on the CCM	At least one round of discussions held in each location with local spinsari	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO held discussions with spinsari in each project location, and incorporated their suggestions into women's engagement strategies</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.6 Number of suggestions received from spinsari</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(see above)</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.7 Number of spinsaris' suggestions incorporated</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(see above)</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.8 Number of discussions held with government personnel</b>	Consult with government personnel re	At least one round of discussions held in each location with local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO held discussion with government officials in each location, and incorporated their suggestions</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
	<p>women's role on CCMs</p> <p>Evaluate and as possible incorporate suggestions</p>	government officials	
<b>1.4.9 Strategies for improving women's representations on the CCMs developed</b>	<p>Final consultations with CCM members</p> <p>Final consultations with project staff</p> <p>Implement strategies for mainstreaming women onto the CCMs</p>	Three women's engagement strategies produced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Khost and Logar, the CCMs incorporated women members, as well as including additional women leaders for project training. Additionally, in each location, each CCM endorsed the creation of a provincial women's CCM for the next year of the project.</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.10 Number of CCM cases in which women participate</b>	(see above)	Women's engagement strategies implemented in each target province	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women CCM members involved in all cases in which women were a direct party, and consulted in other cases.</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.11 Elders' responses to/ perception of women's participation</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Here CCM members, primarily elders, responded positively to serving alongside women members, and endorsed full women's CCMs for the next project year</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.12 Number of factors identified re: the contribution of women (or its lack) in the CCMs</b>	<p>Interview CCM members</p> <p>Review CCM cases</p> <p>Confer with DWA and CSOs</p> <p>Draft analyses of women's role in CCMs</p>	Women's role in CCMs reviewed and analyzed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO and the CCMs have developed a responsive strategy for building on the women's engagement achievements of year 1, and expanding them in year 2</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
	Finalize analysis of women's role in the CCMs		
<b>1.4.13 The ability to incorporate these factors into revised women's engagement strategy</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As part of this report, a new women's engagement strategy has been produced.</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.14 Government and CSOs' perception of women's involvement in the CCMs</b>	Confer with DWA and CSOs	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To this point, DWA and CSOs have endorsed the work of the CCM, and called for their expansion by the addition of full-fledged women's CCMs in year 2</li> </ul>
<b>1.4.15 Elders' perceptions of/reaction to women's engagement on the CCMs</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CCM elders themselves have recommended expanding women's engagement, and women's CCMs, in year 2 – their degree of engagement runs well ahead of expectations</li> </ul>
<b>2.1.1 Number of confidence building meetings held</b>	<p>Make logistical arrangements for meetings</p> <p>Contact CCM members and government officials with final meeting plans</p> <p>Conduct meetings</p>	Five confidence-building meetings conducted in each location	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8 confidence-building meetings conducted in Khost, 8 in Paktia, and 9 in Logar – thus target exceeded in each location</li> </ul>
<b>2.1.2 Attendance composition of confidence-building meetings</b>	(see above)	Meetings with officials most relevant to CCM activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In each location, the CCMs met regularly with the provincial governor and Huquq Department, and periodically with judicial officials and the provincial Department of Women's Affairs</li> </ul>
<b>2.1.3 Number of</b>	(see above)	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO recorded the provincial CCMs meeting with government</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>government-CCM meetings taking place outside of monthly government-CCM confidence building meetings</b>			<p>officials on a roughly bi-weekly basis after initial confidence had been established: thus most government-CCM meetings in each location took place above and beyond official project requirements</p>
<b>2.1.4 Number of (written) CCM-government agreements</b>	<p>Conduct meetings with CCM members</p> <p>Conduct meetings between government personnel and CCM members</p> <p>Draft and finalize cooperation structures</p>	<p>Long-term agreements on government-CCM cooperation in each province</p> <p>Continued collaboration between the CCMs and government structures</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In each province, government-CCM cooperation has exceeded initial expectations, and that despite change in government personnel (particularly in Logar). However, the provincial governments have been reluctant to put these agreements in writing, at least in part because (according to the officials) of unclear signals, at the Kabul level, regarding the desirability of cooperating with informal governance structures.</li> </ul>
<b>2.1.5 Number of government entities involved in these agreements</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Despite the absence of written agreements, the CCMs have enjoyed close cooperation with government entities, especially the office of the governor, and Huquq Department, and periodic cooperation with the police and Departments of Justice and Women's Affairs</li> </ul>
<b>2.1.6 Number of disputes referred from, or recorded by, formal government</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Of the disputes settled by the CCMs, 14 (or about 30%) were referred from, and then registered with, formal authorities. Here, Khost (33%) and Logar (about 40%) showed notably more frequent registration than did Paktia (about 15% of cases registered)</li> </ul>
<b>2.1.7 Number of meetings held after institution of government-CCM cooperation structures</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As previously mentioned, despite the absence of written agreements, government-CCM meetings actually took place significantly more frequently than stipulated by the project itself.</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
<b>2.2.1 Written ToRs for support center staff</b>	Develop ToRs for support center staff	Staff ToRs developed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The report noted above that TLO recruited a well-qualified Kabul Liaison Officer, but one used to working with a high degree of independence – thus no specific ToR was developed. However, this proved a mistake, and TLO is reformulating this component for year 2.</li> </ul>
<b>2.2.2 Employment contracts signed with support center staff</b>	Recruit support center staff	Key Support Center staff retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All support center staff were retained without difficulty.</li> </ul>
<b>2.2.3 Written price quotes received for support center facilities</b>	Review possible facilities for support center	Possible facilities reviewed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO received written price quotes for all potential support center sites</li> </ul>
<b>2.2.4 Rental contract signed for support center facilities</b>	Rent facilities for support center	Rental of one large house or similar structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Having received price quotes, TLO signed a contract for an appropriate, older structure with large garden in Sher Pur</li> </ul>
<b>2.2.5 Kabul-level cooperation agreement instantiated in a memorandum of understanding or similar document</b>	<p>Discussions of support center with Kabul officials</p> <p>Informal agreement between CCMs and Kabul officials re: general cooperation</p>	At least four meetings with Kabul officials (one with TLO staff, and three with provincial delegations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No such meetings took place or agreement was obtained, and TLO is reformulating this project element for year 2.</li> </ul>
<b>2.2.6 The written instantiation of a cooperation scheme between the CCMs and Kabul officials</b>	<p>Discussions with CCM members</p> <p>Discussions with Kabul officials</p>	One cooperation scheme developed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No such scheme was developed, and TLO is reformulating this project element for year 2.</li> </ul>

Indicator	Activity	Target	Achievements
	Draft and finalize cooperation scheme		
<b>2.2.7 Number of meetings or other collaborative endeavors held between the CCMs and Kabul officials</b>	Cooperation scheme implemented  Regular records kept of meetings and other collaborations	Each provincial CCM executes its scheme along with Kabul officials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although the RCCM saw some considerable success in building NGO and international stakeholder links, meetings with Kabul officials never obtained any momentum, and thus TLO is reformulating this project aspect for year 2.</li> </ul>
<b>2.2.8 Number of meetings held with CCM members, project staff, and government officials to evaluate CCM-government cooperation</b>	Meetings with CCM members, project staff and government officials  Analyze cooperation structures  Finalize cooperation structures based upon this feedback	Recommendations developed to improve cooperation at the Kabul level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TLO and CCM members met several times to develop ideas for how to improve this project element. However, because no substantial links with Kabul government officials had been built, they were not at this time included in the process (although that will hopefully change)</li> </ul>
<b>2.2.9 Officials perception of the CCMs, and the CCMs' perception of efforts by government officials</b>	(see above)	(see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Given the lack of functioning Kabul-level outreach, the perception of CCM members seems to be neutral to negative. At the same time, the predominant reaction of Kabul officials, to this point in the project, appears to be disinterest.</li> </ul>